Messages in this thread | ![/](/images/icornerl.gif) | | Date | Thu, 24 Apr 2003 02:46:11 -0600 (MDT) | From | Dax Kelson <> | Subject | Re: Flame Linus to a crisp! |
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On Thu, 24 Apr 2003 Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> On top of which, if a buffer overflow is found, the exploit will run in > the context of the signed program.
Two examples I can think of right now:
1. Manipulated 007 save games files can subvert the Xbox when they overflow the trusted game. 2. The "hack resistant" series 2 Tivo boxes can be subverted by a insecure, signed Linux kernel.
The Tivo kernel is signed with ElGamal, and the Tivo firmware will refuse to run a non-signed kernel and initrd image. The initrd image has SHA1 hashes of all the bootup config files, binaries and and a hash checker. The idea here is that Tivo can control what is executed.
Turns out Tivo signed a kernel+initrd that wasn't locked down properly. Oops! This kernel+initrd package has become a hot commodity.
The pieces that come together are:
1. All directories/files are verified EXCEPT stuff on /var - However, none of the hash checked boot scripts reference anything on /var
2. Users can control what command line is passed to the kernel
3. Users can put the Tivo hard drive in a PC and put stuff on /var.
Finally, Tivo didn't validate/scrub the kernel command line properly, and people were able to get their own daemons and code running, stored on /var, by passing BASH_ENV with a funky value to the kernel.
Dax Kelson
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