Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: posix capabilities inheritance | Date | Thu, 23 Oct 2003 21:36:36 -0400 | From | Ernie Petrides <> |
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On Thursday, 23-Oct-2003 at 17:5 CDT, "Michael Glasgow" wrote:
> The code to drop privs is not hard, but it's also not trivial.
Here's an example code sequence that demonstrates how a setuid-to-root application could drop all capabilities except for CAP_IPC_LOCK and then run with the non-privileged uid:
#include <sys/prctl.h> #include <sys/capability.h>
...
cap_t c;
if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1UL, 0UL, 0UL, 0UL) < 0 || seteuid(getuid()) < 0 || !(c = cap_from_text("cap_ipc_lock=eip")) || cap_set_proc(c) < 0) /* handle error */;
However, I agree that it's often not viable to require application changes to achieve the desired result.
Cheers. -ernie - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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