Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [security]: kernel ioctl()'s [3] | Date | Fri, 02 Jul 1999 00:43:46 -0700 | From | Jim Dennis <> |
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> Chris Evans wrote:
>> Because programs running as root assume
>> open("blah", O_RDWR) >> write(blah)
>> will work. They do NOT expect to have to
>> open("blah", O_RDWR) >> if (-EPERM) >> chflags("blah", immutable off) >> open("blah", O_RDWR)
> assumptions are generally bad.
Failure to check for errors is often BAD.
> two situations immediately come to mind.
> - extended attribute; immutable > - extended attribute; append only > - filesystem mounted RO > - 100% filesystem usage, 0% free
--- that's four;
Let's also add
- System is BSD 4.4 and user immutable or user append-only UFS flag is set.
> therefore the first example is very very bad. > always check your return values, expect the unexpected and survive. =) > -d
-- Jim Dennis jdennis@linuxcare.com Linuxcare: Linux Corporate Support Team: http://www.linuxcare.com
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