Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 17 May 1999 10:19:00 -0700 (PDT) | From | Y2K <> | Subject | Re: More capabilities stuff... |
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On Sun, 16 May 1999, John Wojtowicz wrote: > I would believe that eventually you would want to convert all uid 0 > checks in the kernel to > capabilities checks. Already be done fairly well. If you find one that isn't yet done then its a bug. Also has issecure(SECURE_NOROOT) and issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) . > Then if you've compiled the kernel with out > capabilities enabled, > you'd dummy up the effective, permitted and inheritable sets for all > uid 0 processes to > have ALL privileges in it, and all other normal users have NONE in their > process capability sets. > If it is enabled then you perform the normal capabilities calculations > whenever a process is > exec()'ed. There is support is fs/exec.c(prepare_binprm and compute_creds) for what happens when you exec. there is also cap_emulate_setxuid in kernel/sys.c that controls what happens when you setreuid and family. > Is this the plan Linus? > Capabilities checks should apply to all programs and processes not just > setuid root ones, or ones > run by root. Thats the whole point of principle of least privilege, to > obsolete the setuid bit > and the all powerful root user. Yes and its being done. Could you check some of the changes in prepare_binprm etc and see if they are to your liking?
-- Any caps I mention are *derived* from a withdrawn draft posix document. See http://www.millenniumproductsllc.com/sjp/ for more info.
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