lkml.org 
[lkml]   [1999]   [Mar]   [3]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: current->dumpable=0
On Wed, 3 Mar 1999, Martin Mares wrote:

> Is there any reason for setting current->dumpable to 0 in sys_setuid()?
> It seems to me it doesn't close any security problem (since you need to
> be root to change UID and if it the program was setuid, core dumps
> should have been already disabled at this point) and it makes debugging
> of daemons switching their UID a lot harder.

Consider the case where login (or some other such program - maybe ftpd)
switches uid but still has a lump of the shadow password file somewhere,
or of some unreadable config file.

Perhaps we should add a SIGCORE which just causes the kernel to drop the
process image as a core file (without necessarily killing the process).

Matthew.


-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.rutgers.edu
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2005-03-22 13:50    [W:0.067 / U:0.348 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site