Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 3 Mar 1999 16:13:46 +0000 (GMT) | From | Matthew Kirkwood <> | Subject | Re: current->dumpable=0 |
| |
On Wed, 3 Mar 1999, Martin Mares wrote:
> Is there any reason for setting current->dumpable to 0 in sys_setuid()? > It seems to me it doesn't close any security problem (since you need to > be root to change UID and if it the program was setuid, core dumps > should have been already disabled at this point) and it makes debugging > of daemons switching their UID a lot harder.
Consider the case where login (or some other such program - maybe ftpd) switches uid but still has a lump of the shadow password file somewhere, or of some unreadable config file.
Perhaps we should add a SIGCORE which just causes the kernel to drop the process image as a core file (without necessarily killing the process).
Matthew.
- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.rutgers.edu Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
| |