Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 28 Dec 1999 15:01:48 -0600 (CST) | From | Jesse Pollard <> | Subject | Re: Unexecutable stack |
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Steve VanDevender <stevev@efn.org> >I do realize that a non-executable stack only raises the bar for >exploit attempts. But when nearly all security exploits for the >past several years have been stack buffer overruns on root-run or >setuid-root programs, a non-executable stack really does make a >practical difference. I'm really tired of hearing people dismiss >practical security solutions because they don't protect against >everything; no single security technique protects against >everything. The only real way to achieve security is using all >the techniques that you can, and thoroughness in system >management and monitoring, to get as much protection as possible >and detect the things you can't protect against.
Bravo. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jesse I Pollard, II Email: pollard@navo.hpc.mil
Any opinions expressed are solely my own.
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