Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sun, 5 Apr 1998 22:21:01 +0200 | From | Alexander Kjeldaas <> | Subject | Re: Security patch for /proc |
| |
On Sun, Apr 05, 1998 at 08:14:53AM -0400, Raul Miller wrote: > Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@zip.com.au> wrote: > > - I disallow access to all proc entries for a process, which is > > probably a little draconian. > > Hmm... what about when chroot is used to bring up the system (in a > fashion analogous to initrd, but without being ramdisk specific)? > > I think what you'd really need for security is not just chroot, but > something to declare certain file systems (and their corresponding > devices) off limits to a process and its decendants. Then it wouldn't > matter how the references to those file systems were generated. >
This can be achieved with what is called 'type enforcement'. Basically you assign a type to all files on the system. Then you let processes be allowed certain operations on types of files. Type enforcement is a type of mandatory access control.
What people often really want when you use chroot is some sort of mandatory access control to files on the system. What *I* usually want when I use chroot is to have a 'machine within the machine' - to be able to bootstrap a system for example. That's what chroot is good for.
astor
-- Alexander Kjeldaas, Guardian Networks AS, Trondheim, Norway http://www.guardian.no/
- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.rutgers.edu
| |