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SubjectRe: [PATCH v5 0/3] implement OA2_CRED_INHERIT flag for openat2()
On Tue, May 7, 2024 at 12:42 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> > With my kernel hat on, maybe I agree. But with my *user* hat on, I
> > think I pretty strongly disagree. Look, idmapis lousy for
> > unprivileged use:
> >
> > $ install -m 0700 -d test_directory
> > $ echo 'hi there' >test_directory/file
> > $ podman run -it --rm
> > --mount=type=bind,src=test_directory,dst=/tmp,idmap [debian-slim]
>
> $ podman run -it --rm --mount=type=bind,src=test_directory,dst=/tmp,idmap [debian-slim]
>
> as an unprivileged user doesn't use idmapped mounts at all. So I'm not
> sure what this is showing. I suppose you're talking about idmaps in
> general.

Meh, fair enough. But I don't think this would have worked any better
with privilege.

Can idmaps be programmed by an otherwise unprivileged owner of a
userns and a mountns inside?

> Many idmappings to one is in principle possible and I've noted that idea
> down as a possible extension at
> https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features quite a while (2 years?) ago.
>
> > I haven't looked at the idmap implementation nearly enough to have any
> > opinion as to whether squashing UID is practical or whether there's
>
> It's doable. The interesting bit to me was that if we want to allow
> writes we'd need a way to determine what the uid/gid would be to write
> down. Imho, that's not super difficult to solve though. The most obvious
> one is that userspace can just determine it when creating the idmapped
> mount.

Seems reasonable to me. If this is set up by someone unprivileged, it
would need to be that uid/gid.

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